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Abstract. We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents
each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and
are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the net-
work. Recent work on this model has contrasted the social cost of Nash
equilibria with the best possible social cost.
Here we show that additional costs are incurred in situations where a
selfish “leader” agent allocates his flow, and then commits to that choice
so that other agents are compelled to minimise their own cost based on
the first agent’s choice. We find that even in simple networks, the leader
can often improve his own cost at the expense of increased social cost.
Focussing on the 2-player case, we give upper and lower bounds on the
worst-case additional cost incurred.
1 Introduction
Imagine that two firms wish to route traffic from a source to a destination
through a shared network. Any link suffers from a delay (also called latency)
that increases with the amount of traffic that it attracts, and both firms want
to minimise their own total delay. It is known (e.g. [10, 4]) that the resulting
social cost (sum of individuals’ delays) is suboptimal, even for simple networks.
If for example some but not all links are privately-owned, there is a tendency
for both firms to over-use the shared link, in order to relieve pressure on the
privately-owned links (Catoni and Pallottino [2], Cominetti et al. [4]).
Viewing this as a non-cooperative two-player game, suppose now one of the
firms (player 1) is “forceful”, and the other one (player 2) is “pliant”. Player 1
may find that it pays to over-use a shared link even more than before, pro-
vided that player 2 responds by moving some of his own traffic away from the
shared link and onto player 2’s private links. As a consequence, it turns out that
player 1’s total delay may fall, but player 2’s total delay increases by a greater
amount, thus increasing the social cost.
One way to model forceful and pliant players, is to let player 1 have Stack-
elberg leadership: player 1 selects his strategy, namely the split of his own flow
between the links available to him. Then, player 2 chooses his strategy based
on player 1’s choice, under the assumption that player 1 will not subsequently
change his decision.
Thus there may be a social cost of Stackelberg leadership over and above
the cost of selfish decentralised decision-making. In this paper we focus on a
simple and well-known setting in which the players have access to a set of shared
“parallel links”. Note that this is more restrictive than the scenario described
above in that there are no private links. We give a simple example of how selfish
stackelberg leadership (which we usually abbreviate to SSL) may nevertheless
have a positive cost in this setting, and motivated by that example, we establish
an upper bound on the price of SSL.
1.1 Summary of results
Our focus is on the 2-player atomic-splittable case, with parallel links having
linear latency functions. In Subsection 2.1 we show that if there exists a player
having Stackelberg leadership, then the social cost may be higher than in the
Nash-Cournot setting. Furthermore, the remaining flow may even be disadvan-
taged as a direct result of being controlled by a single player, rather than a
Wardrop flow. This situation arises in a very simple setting in which two play-
ers both have access to just two links having affine linear latency functions.
This furnishes a lower bound on the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership, of a
multiplicative factor 1.057.
Subsection 2.5 gives our main result, a contrasting upper bound. We analyse
games with two players each needing to route splittable flow through a shared
network of parallel links having linear latency functions. If the latency functions
are homogenous, there is no cost of SSL. However, for the case of affine latency
functions, we show that the worst-case price of SSL is a multiplicative constant
(thus, independent of the number of links), at most 1.322.
1.2 Related work
A large body of recent work (initiated mainly by Roughgarden and Tardos [20,
19]) has studied from a game-theory perspective, how selfishness can degrade
the overall performance of a system that has multiple (selfish) users. Much of
this work has focused on situations where users have access to shared resources,
and the cost of using a resource increases as the resource attracts more usage.
Our focus here is on the “parallel links” network topology, also referred to as
scheduling jobs to a set of load-dependent machines, which is one of the most
commonly studied models (e.g. [6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18]). Papers such as [1, 6, 12]
have studied the price of anarchy for these games in the “unsplittable flow” set-
ting, where each user may only use a single resource. In contrast we study the
“splittable flow” setting of [14]. This version (finitely many players, splittable
flow) was shown in [14, 15] to possess unique pure Nash equilibria (see Defini-
tion 2). Hayrapetyan et al. [10] study the cost of selfish behaviour in this model,
and compare it with the cost of selfish behaviour in the Wardrop model (i.e.
infinitely many infinitesimal users).
Stackelberg leadership refers to a game-theoretic situation where one player
(the “leader”) selects his action first, and commits to it. The other player(s)
then choose their own action based on the choice made by the leader. Recent
work on Stackelberg scheduling in the context of network flow (e.g. [5, 18, 21]),
has studied it as a tool to mitigate the performance degradation due to selfish
users. The flow that is controlled by the leader is routed so as to minimise social
cost in the presence of followers who minimise their own costs. In contrast, here
we consider what happens when the leading flow is controlled by another selfish
agent. We show here that the price of decentralised behaviour goes up even
further in the presence of a Stackelberg leader.
Other papers that consider finitely many players each of which may split their
flow amongst the available paths are [3, 4, 16]. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [3]
study the price of anarchy in a similar model to this work, but they consider
the social cost as either the maximum cost of a player or the average of the
players’ costs. Cominetti et al. [4] study the price of selfish routing in the context
of Nash equilibria in this setting. They give examples of how the aggregation of
flow into a finite number of competing firms, can introduce inefficiency to the
outcome. They give bounds on how much the total Nash cost can differ from the
socially optimal cost. It is shown in [4] that in a network of parallel links with
homogeneous linear latencies, Wardrop equilibria, Nash equilibria and System
optimal flows all coincide. We show that with affine linear latencies, there is a
positive cost of SSL; also there is a positive cost for simple examples from [4, 2]
involving private and shared links.
1.3 Model, Notation and Terminology
Let m be the number of players, and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, player i has a flow f i ∈
IR+. (In related literature, “flow” is sometimes called “weight” or “demand”.) A
strategy of player i is a partition of f i amongst n resources (or links, available to
carry flow), f i =
∑n
j=1 f
i
j , where f
i
j is the non-negative flow assigned to link j by
player i. Given total flow f , fj denotes the portion of f on link j, i.e. fj =
∑
i f
i
j .
The network flow scenario being modelled has all players with a common source
and common destination, connected by n “parallel links” through which the
players may route their flow.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n let ℓj : IR
+ −→ IR+ denote link j’s latency (or cost) function;
this maps the load on j to the cost of using j. Latency functions are positive
and non-decreasing. In this paper, we work with linear latency functions. Link
j has latency function ℓj(fj) = ajfj + bj , for non-negative numbers aj and bj .
That functional form is an affine linear cost; a homogeneous linear cost function
takes the form ℓj(fj) = ajfj .
Suppose that f represents an allocation of flow for each agent across the
available resources. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, fj denotes the flow on j. It is sometimes
useful to let ℓj(f) denote ℓj(fj), the cost of using link j in f .
Normalisation. We assume that links are numbered in ascending order of
bj , so that for j < j
′, bj ≤ bj′ . We will also assume throughout that b1 = 0. This
is because flow distributions are unaffected by adding a constant to all the bj’s
(by analogy with the common observation that the Nash equilibria of a game are
unaffected by adding a constant to all payoffs.) Setting b1 = 0 maximises ratios
between alternative social costs, which is what we are interested in maximising.
We mainly focus on the 2-player case. We usually assume (by re-scaling as
necessary) that the total flow is one (unless we explicitly state another quantity).
In this case we let α denote player 1’s flow, so that 1− α is player 2’s flow.
Definition 1. The cost experienced by a player is the sum, over all paths used
by that player, of the amount of that player’s flow on that path multiplied by
the cost of using that path. (That cost is of course affected by the other players’
choices.) Thus, the cost experienced by player i in flow f is given by
∑
j f
i
jℓj(f).
The social cost is the sum of the individual players’ costs.
Note that the social cost can be expressed as the sum over all links, of the
flow on that link multiplied by the cost of using that link; C =
∑
j fjℓj(fj).
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies {f ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤
j ≤ n} such that no player can reduce his cost (as in Definition 1) by changing
his own strategy.
Definition 3. Our selfish Stackelberg leadership (SSL) solution concept is sub-
game perfect equilibrium: Assume that player 1 is the leader; player 1 selects his
strategy and players 2 . . .m form a m − 1-player Nash equilibrium with latency
functions that have been modified to take into account player 1’s strategy. It is
assumed that player 1 selects his strategy to minimise his own cost under that
assumption on the other players. In the 2-player case studied here, player 2 must
make an optimal allocation of his own flow based on latency functions that have
been affected by player 1’s flow allocation.
Definition 4. Suppose a finite number m of agents want to route flow through
a network. The price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is the ratio between the
social costs of the worst (maximum social cost) SSL solution that occurs when
one of the agents is a leader, and the unique Nash equilibrium that arises in the
standard simultaneous setting.
2 Bounding the Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership
This section is organised as follows. In Section 2.1 we describe the simple ex-
ample that gives the lower bound of 1.057 on the multiplicative cost of selfish
Stackelberg leadership. In Section 2.2 we give some basic results about social
optimal flow in this setting. In Section 2.3 we describe 2 strategies, one for each
player, which have useful upper bounds on the individual costs they incur. (In
particular, since they guarantee each player an individual cost at most the opti-
mal social cost, they give an upper bound of 2 on the cost of selfish Stackelberg
leadership.) In Section 2.4 we show that in fact they give a stronger upper bound
of 43 . Finally, in Section 2.5 we show by dint of a more complicated analysis, and
by also considering the aloof strategy of Roughgarden [18], an upper bound of
slightly less than 43 .
2.1 Lower Bound in Simple Symmetric Network
We start our investigation of the price of Stackelberg leadership by considering
an example of the simplest kind of network having a cost of SSL greater than 1.
There are two players; player 1 with a flow of 35 and player 2 with a flow of
2
5 .
Players want to transfer flows on a network with two parallel links. Link 1 has
a latency function ℓ1(f1) = f1 and link 2 has a latency function ℓ2(f2) =
6
5 .
For this network, the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is 9388 ≈ 1.057. In
the appendix (Section 4.2) we evaluate the resulting solutions and explain how
we optimised the constants involved to show that this is in fact the largest price
of SSL that arises in the 2-link affine linear cost setting. (For non-linear latency
functions we have obtained a price of SSL of 1.169, arising when ℓ1(f1) = (f1)
4
and ℓ2(f2) = 5.67, and players’ flows are f
1 = 1, f2 = 0.587.)
2.2 Social Optimal Flow
In this subsection we note some basic facts about the behaviour of social optimal
flow. In [2], socially optimal flow is called “system equilibrium” (SE). We let
fSE denote the social optimal flow. The following lemma is a special case of
Lemma 4.1(b) of Roughgarden and Tardos [20].
Lemma 1. (Roughgarden and Tardos [20]) For affine latency functions ℓj(fj) =
ajfj+bj, the single-player (socially optimal) flow has the property that 2ajfj+bj
is the same for all links j on which flow is routed.
Proof. The lemma is a special case of Lemma 4.1(b) of Roughgarden and Tar-
dos [20]. A proof is given in the appendix since the proof is simpler in this special
case. ⊓⊔
Observation 1 If 2ajfj + bj is the same for all j, then note that latencies
ℓj(fj) = ajfj + bj cannot differ by a factor more than 2.
One consequence of the above observation is that all latencies end up within
a factor of 2 of each other (for links that carry non-zero flow).
Lemma 2. For affine linear latencies ℓj(fj) = ajfj + bj, suppose links j and j
′
both carry flow in fSE (recall fSE denote socially optimal flow). Assume j < j
′
and bj < bj′ . Then ℓj′(fSE)− ℓj(fSE) =
1
2 (bj′ − bj).
Proof. If j and j′ both carry flow, then we noted above that 2ajfj + bj is the
same for all j.
2(ℓj′(f)− ℓj(f)) = (2aj′fj′ + 2bj′)− (2ajfj + 2bj)
= (2aj′fj′ + bj′)− (2ajfj + bj) + bj′ − bj = bj′ − bj .
⊓⊔
Note that Lemma 2 implies the fact (shown in [10]) that in the homogeneous
linear case (where all bj ’s are zero) the latencies are equal in socially optimal
flow.
Another consequence is that if a socially optimal flow is routed through a set
of links, then given our assumption that links are indexed in increasing order of
bj , their latencies ℓj(fSE) are sorted in increasing order of j (and for links that
are used, differ by half the latency difference when flow is zero).
2.3 Properties of First and Second player in Stackelberg equilibria
Recall that we abbreviate Selfish Stackelberg Leadership to SSL, and fSSL de-
notes the total flow of two players where the first player is a leader. CSE and
CSSL denote respectively the social optimal cost and the social cost in fSSL.
The first player decides how much of his flow to be routed on each link,
and commits to that decision. From player 2’s perspective, for the affine linear
latency functions, the leader has essentially increased the latency functions by
constants corresponding to the flow he routed on each link. So now the second
player should find an optimal flow using the new latency function given by
ℓj(f
2
j ) = aj .f
2
j + (bj + aj.f
1
j )
Lemma 3. In fSSL, every link used by the last player has a latency at most
twice the minimum latency.
Proof. After player 1 plays, the new latency functions are still inhomogeneous
linear. Apply Observation 1. ⊓⊔
Two Strategies. We present two simple strategies for player 1 and player 2
that can guarantee each of them an individual cost at most CSE . (Thus a simple
combination of these results indicates that CSSL ≤ 2CSE .) It should be pointed
out that these strategies are not necessary optimal for player 1 and 2.
Strategy 1: The general idea is that player 1 allocates his flow f1 such that when
player 2 minimises his own cost, the combined flow is socially optimal. Provided
player 1 can achieve this, it follows immediately that player 1’s cost is at most
CSE , which is the total cost for both players.
Denote SSE and S2 sets of links used by the social optimal flow and player 2
respectively. Player 1’s strategy to make the total flow socially optimal is to
ensure that the difference between any two link latencies in S2 remains the same
after he has played. Recall that links are indexed in increasing order of constant
values, i.e., for j < j′, bj ≤ bj′ (where bj = ℓj(0)). The strategy is as follows:
1. Compute the social optimal flow fSE .
2. Check whether SSE−S2 6= ∅ by checking if f2 ≥
∑
1≤i≤|SSE|
(b|SSE| − bi)/(2ai).
Player 1 fills up all the links in SSE − S2 to the level of what should occur
in fSE : f
1
j = (fj)SE for every link j in SSE − S2.
3. Player 1 splits the remainder of his flow among all the links in S2 such
that every links is increased with the same amount of latency: f1j = (f
1 −
f1(SSE−S2))/(aj
∑
j∈S2
1
aj
) for every link j ∈ S2.
Strategy 2 : We consider the following strategy for player 2:
1. Compute the social optimal flow (for total flow of both players) fSE .
2. In link j, if f1j < (fSE)j , player 2 increases the flow on j to the fSE level. If
f1j < (fSE)j , f
2
j = (fSE)j − f
1
j for every link j.
With this strategy, if on every link player 1 routes less flow than the social
optimal flow then player 2 just makes up the difference. If there are some links
that player 1 routes more than the social optimal flow then there is enough room
on the remaining links for player 2 to use those without making their flow more
than the social optimal flow.
2.4 Quick Upper Bound of 4
3
With those strategies we give an upper bound on player 1’s cost and player 2’s
cost in the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let ℓmin be the minimal latency of links under the socially optimal
flow fSE. In the SSL setting with linear cost functions, player 1’s cost is at most
min{2αℓmin, CSE − (1− α)ℓmin}, where α is player 1’s flow, out of a total flow
of 1.
Proof. Applying Strategy 1, player 1 causes the combined flow to be socially
optimal flow fSE. In that scenario, player 1’s cost is CSE minus player 2’s cost
which is at least all of player 2’s flow f2 multiplied by the minimal latency ℓmin,
i.e. (1 − α)ℓmin. Hence player 1’s cost is at most CSE − (1 − α)ℓmin. (It is of
course possible that player 1 could do better by not using Strategy 1.)
In addition, player 1’s cost cannot be any higher than the cost of him putting
all of his flow of α on the maximal latency links. Furthermore, from Observation
1, the maximal latency is at most 2ℓmin for links that get used. Hence player 1’s
cost is at most 2αℓmin.
Combining those two results, we have player 1’s cost is at most min{2αℓmin,
CSE − (1− α)ℓmin}. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. Let ℓmin be the minimal latency of links under the socially optimal
flow fSE. In the SSL setting with linear cost functions, player 1’s cost is at most
min{CSE − αℓmin, 2(1− α)ℓmin}, where α is player 1’s flow, out of a total flow
of 1.
Proof. Applying Strategy 2, player 2’s cost is at most CSE minus player 1’s
cost which is minimised when all player 1’s flow is on the minimal latency links.
Hence player 2’s cost is at most CSE−αℓmin. (It is of course possible that player
2 could do better by not using Strategy 2.)
Moreover because player 2’s cost is maximised when all player 2’s flow is in
the maximal latency links and, for latencies of links that get used, the maximal
latency is at most twice the minimal latency, player 2’s cost is at most (1 −
α)ℓmax ≤ 2(1− α)ℓmin.
Combining those results, we essentially have C2 ≤ min{CSE − αℓmin, 2(1−
α)ℓmin}. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. In a two-player network model with non-decreasing linear latency
functions, the price of SSL is at most 4/3.
Proof. Recall that ℓmin denotes the minimal latency of a link in flow fSE. Note
that with one unit of flow in total (which we assured by rescaling as necessary)
CSE ∈ [ℓmin, 2ℓmin]. (Using Observation 1.)
First consider when CSE ≥ (3/2)ℓmin. In this case, from Lemma 4 and 5,
min{2αℓmin, CSE−(1−α)ℓmin} = 2αℓmin and min{CSE−αℓmin, 2(1−α)ℓmin} =
2(1− α)ℓmin. Thus CSSL is at most 2αℓmin + 2(1− α)ℓmin = 2ℓmin. Hence the
ratio between CSSL and CSE is bounded by
CSSL
CSE
≤ 2ℓmin(3/2)ℓmin =
4
3 .
Next suppose CSE < (3/2)ℓmin. Then min{2αℓmin, CSE − (1 − α)ℓmin} =
CSE − (1− α)ℓmin and min{CSE − αℓmin, 2(1− α)ℓmin} = CSE − αℓmin. Thus
CSLL is at most CSE − (1−α)ℓmin +CSE −αℓmin = 2CSE −αℓmin. Hence the
the ratio between CSSL and CSE is at most
CSSL
CSE
≤ 2CSE−ℓminCSE ≤ 2−
ℓmin
(3/2)ℓmin
= 43 .
⊓⊔
Applying this approach we can bound the price of SSL in more detail, in
terms of the ratio between the social optimum cost and the minimum latency,
or player 1’s flow α.
Lemma 6. Let CSE = γℓmin where 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2. Then
– if γ ≥ 32 then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership ≤
2
γ ;
– if γ < 32 then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership ≤
2γ−1
γ .
Proof. When γ ≥ 3/2 then CSSL ≤ 2ℓmin. Hence the price of SSL is upper
bounded by
2ℓmin
CSE
≤ 2ℓminγℓmin =
2
γ .
Next suppose γ < 3/2 then CSSL ≤ 2CSE − ℓmin. Hence the price of SSL is
upper bounded by
2CSE−ℓmin
CSE
= 2− ℓminγℓmin =
2γ−1
γ .
⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let α = f1 where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 then:
– if α ≥ 12 then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership ≤ 1 +
2(1−α)
3 .
– if α < 12 then the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership ≤ 1 +
2α
3 .
Proof. If α ≥ 1/2 then CSSL ≤ CSE + (1− α)ℓmin (note from Lemma 4 and 5,
C1 ≤ CSE − (1 − α)ℓmin and C
2 ≤ 2(1− α)ℓmin). It was shown in the proof of
Theorem 1 that the price of SSL is maximised when CSE = (3/2)ℓmin. Hence
the upper bound of the the price of SSL is given by
CSE+(1−α)ℓmin
CSE
≤ 1 + (1−α)ℓmin(3/2)ℓmin = 1 +
2(1−α)
3 .
If α < 1/2 then CSSL ≤ CSE + αℓmin (note C1 ≤ 2αℓmin and C2 ≤ CSE −
αℓmin). Hence the price of SSL is upper bounded by
CSE+αℓmin
CSE
≤ 1 + αℓmin(3/2)ℓmin = 1 +
2α
3 .
⊓⊔
2.5 An Upper Bound of Less than 4
3
We prove an upper bound on the price of SSL of less than 4/3. To do that we
improve the upper bound for player 1’s cost in Lemma 4 in which player 1’s
cost is bounded under the pessimistic assumption that in a situation where he
creates the social optimal flow it is possible for all of player 1’s flow to get the
maximal latency and all of player 2’s flow to get the minimal latency.
Now let us define the following property that a socially optimal flow may or
may not have, depending on the latency functions of the links. The case analysis
used in what follows is based on the property, called the diverse latency property.
Definition 5. We say that a socially optimal flow fSE has the diverse latency
property (DLP) if at least 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at most 1.16ℓmin and
at least 1/4 of the flow gets a latency of at least 1.84ℓmin.
We start by proving an upper bound in the case that the DLP is satisfied,
then we use an alternative proof in the case that it is not satisfied. When the
DLP is satisfied, instead of using Strategy 1, we apply a strategy called the aloof
strategy [18] that corresponds more with what selfish player 1 would do.
Definition 6. Aloof strategy: (Roughgarden [18]): player 1 routes f1 optimising
his cost in player 2’s absence: compute the socially-optimal flow for a total flow
volume of f1.
Lemma 8. If the DLP is satisfied by fSE, then player 1’s cost is at most
1.915αℓmin where α = f
1.
Proof. Let Smin and Smax be the sets of links whose latencies in fSE are at most
1.16ℓmin and at least 1.84ℓmin respectively. Note that we refer to the latency of
Smin (respectively, Smax) to mean the maximal latency of links in those sets.
We will assume in this proof that player 1 uses the aloof strategy. We exploit
the fact that when the DLP holds, player 1 gets a better performance using the
aloof strategy instead of Strategy 1 described earlier.
Using the DLP assumption and Lemma 2, the difference between the values
ℓj(0) (i.e. the marginal costs of links when flow is zero) in Smax and Smin is
at least 2 times the difference between the minimal latency in Smax and the
maximal latency in Smin, i.e. 2(1.84ℓmin − 1.16ℓmin) = 1.36ℓmin.
Next we consider fSSL. With the aloof strategy, after player 1 has played, the
latency difference between Smax and Smin is at least half the difference between
the value ℓj(0) in Smax and the value ℓj(0) in Smin. Hence the latency difference
is at least 12 (1.36ℓmin) = 0.68ℓmin. Thus if player 1 uses Smax then the latency
of Smax minus the latency of Smin after player 1 has played is at least 0.68ℓmin.
And if player 1 does not use Smax then the difference is higher than 0.68ℓmin.
Essentially this implies that in player 2’s perspective the fixed cost in Smax is at
least 0.68ℓmin more than that in Smin. By Lemma 3 and Observation 1, there is
not enough flow in total for the latency in Smax of links used by either player to
be > 2ℓmin. Therefore the latency in Smin after player 2 has played is at most
2ℓmin −
1
2 (0.68ℓmin) = 1.66ℓmin.
With the DLP assumption, because there is at least 14 of the total flow
in Smin, player 1 is guaranteed to have at least
1
4 of his flow in Smin. Hence
player 1’s cost is at most 14α1.66ℓmin +
3
4α2ℓmin = 1.915αℓmin. ⊓⊔
For the case when the DLP is not satisfied, we prove the following upper
bound on player 1’s cost.
Lemma 9. If in fSE at most
1
4 of the flow gets a latency of at most 1.16ℓmin
or at most 14 of the flow gets a latency of at least 1.84ℓmin then player 1’s cost
is at most max{CSE − ℓmin/4− 1.16ℓmin(
3
4 − α),
1
2ℓmin + (α−
1
4 )(1.84ℓmin)}.
Proof. If player 1 uses Strategy 1, he can ensure that the combined flow is
socially optimal. In that scenario, player 1’s cost is at most the social optimal
cost minus player 2’s cost which is lowest when all player 2’s flow f2 gets the
latency of ℓmin. However, noting the first alternative of the given assumption,
suppose at most 14 of the total flow gets latency ℓmin, and the rest gets at least
1.16ℓmin. Hence player 1’s cost is at most CSE − ℓmin/4− 1.16ℓmin(
3
4 − α).
Alternatively player 1’s cost is maximised when all of f1 is in maximal latency
links. However, from the second alternative of the given assumption, only 14 of
the flow gets the latency more than 1.84ℓmin and the rest of the flow gets the
latency of at most 1.84ℓmin. Hence player 1’s cost can be at most
1
4 (2ℓmin) +
(α− 14 )(1.84ℓmin) =
1
2ℓmin + (α−
1
4 )(1.84ℓmin). ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. In a two-player model with non-decreasing linear latency function,
the price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is at most 1.322.
Proof. We identify the scope we should restrict our attention to. Lemma 7 shows
that if α = f1 then the upper bound improves to 1 + 2(1−α)3 if α ≥ 1/2 and
1 + 2α3 if α < 1/2. Hence we only consider α ∈ [0.483, 0.517] since Lemma 7
gives the upper bound of less than 1.322 for α outside this range. Similarly we
only consider CSE in the range [1.474ℓmin, 1.513ℓmin] since Lemma 6 suggests
the price of less than 1.322 outside this range.
From Lemma 5, player 2’s cost is at most min{CSE −αℓmin, 2(1−α)ℓmin}.
For player 1’s cost, we have two upper bounds, one for when the DLP holds and
the other for when the DLP does not hold.
First, when the DLP is satisfied, we have the upper bound on player 1’s cost
of 1.915αℓmin from Lemma 8. Combining with player 2’s cost, the price of SSL
is upper bounded by
1.915αℓmin+min{CSE−αℓmin, 2(1−α)ℓmin}
CSE
≤ 1.915αℓmin+CSE−αℓminCSE
= 1 + 0.915αℓminCSE
≤ 1 + 0.915(0.517)ℓmin1.474ℓmin
< 1.321
Second, when the DLP is not satisfied, player 1’s cost is upper bounded by
max{CSE − ℓmin/4− 1.16ℓmin(
3
4 −α),
1
2ℓmin+(α−
1
4 )(1.84ℓmin)}. Within this
proof, we use (1) and (2) to denote the expressions CSE−
1
4ℓmin−1.16ℓmin(
3
4−α)
and 12ℓmin+(α−
1
4 )(1.84ℓmin) respectively. Thus the upper bound for player 1’s
cost can be represented with max{(1), (2)}. We prove the upper bound by ex-
haustive case analysis as follows:
1. Suppose CSE ≥ (3/2)ℓmin, we consider α:
– Suppose α < 1/2: In this scenario max{(1), (2)} = (1). Hence the price
of SSL is upper bounded by:
(1)+min{CSE−αℓmin, 2(1−α)ℓmin}
CSE
≤ CSE−ℓmin/4−1.16ℓmin(3/4−α)+2(1−α)ℓminCSE
= 1 + (0.88−0.84α)ℓminCSE
≤ 1 + (0.88−0.84(0.483))ℓmin(3/2)ℓmin
< 1.317
– Suppose α ≥ 1/2: Now we have player 2’s cost ≤ 2(1 − α)ℓmin, but
player 1’s cost is still at most max{(1), (2)}. The upper bound on the
price of SSL can be considered in two cases:
(a) max{(1), (2)} = (1); the price is at most (1)+2(1−α)ℓminCSE ,
(1)+2(1−α)ℓmin
CSE
= CSE−ℓmin/4−1.16ℓmin(3/4−α)+2(1−α)ℓminCSE
= 1 + (0.88−0.84α)ℓminCSE
≤ 1 + (0.88−0.84(0.5))ℓmin(3/2)ℓmin
< 1.307
(b) or max{(1), (2)} = (2); the price is at most (2)+2(1−α)ℓminCSE ,
(2)+2(1−α)ℓmin
CSE
= ℓmin/2+(α−1/4)(1.84ℓmin)+2(1−α)ℓminCSE
= (2.04−0.16α)ℓminCSE
≤ (2.04−0.16(0.5))ℓmin(3/2)ℓmin
< 1.307
2. Suppose CSE < (3/2)ℓmin, we consider α:
– Suppose α < 1/2: In this condition we have player 2’s cost is at most
CSE −αℓmin. Hence the upper bound of the price of SSL can be consid-
ered in two cases:
(a) max{(1), (2)} = (1); the price is at most (1)+CSE−αℓminCSE ,
(1)+CSE−αℓmin
CSE
= CSE−ℓmin/4−1.16ℓmin(3/4−α)+CSE−αℓminCSE
= 2 + (−1.12+0.16α)ℓminCSE
≤ 2 + (−1.12+0.16(0.5))ℓmin1.5ℓmin
< 1.307
(b) or max{(1), (2)} = (2); the price is at most (2)+CSE−αℓminCSE ,
(2)+CSE−αℓmin
CSE
= ℓmin/2+(α−1/4)(1.84ℓmin)+CSE−αℓminCSE
= 1 + (0.04+0.84α)ℓminCSE
≤ 1 + (0.04+0.84(0.5))ℓmin1.474ℓmin
< 1.313
– Suppose α ≥ 1/2: In this condition max{(1), (2)} = (2). Hence the price
of SSL is upper bounded by:
(2)+min{CSE−αℓmin, 2(1−α)ℓmin}
CSE
≤ (2)+CSE−αℓminCSE
= ℓmin/2+(α−1/4)(1.84ℓmin)+CSE−αℓminCSE
= 1 + (0.025+0.9α)ℓminCSE
≤ 1 + (0.04+0.84(0.517))ℓmin1.474ℓmin
< 1.322
Therefore, when the DLP is not satisfied, we have shown that the price of
SSL is less than 1.322. ⊓⊔
3 Conclusions
We have shown that the worst-case price of selfish Stackelberg leadership is a
multiplicative constant that is independent of the number of links in a parallel-
links network. Furthermore we have identified quite a narrow range for that
constant, namely [1.057, 1.322]. For non-linear latency functions, we have slightly
larger lower bounds on the price of SSL, as noted in Section 2.1. The upper bound
of 2 that we noted in Section 2.3 seems to apply in this case, provided that we
have a network of shared parallel links. It is possible that for parallel links, the
worst-case arises for a 2-link network (by analogy to [17]). Perhaps the main
question to ask is whether there is a more dramatic cost (perhaps depending on
the size of the network) in the setting of more general networks.
One alternative line of work is investigating the price of SSL in a model of
one selfish splittable leader and the rest of the players each with a negligible
fraction of the flow (a Wardrop flow). We believe that there is no price of SSL in
this setting since the SSL solution is essentially the same as Nash equilibrium.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Selfish Stackelberg Leadership in an Asymmetric Network
We consider an example studied in the literature that show a non-trivial cost of
selfish Stackelberg leadership. The network is asymmetric (having private links).
2
5
A B
C D
E F
1
3
4
6
7
Fig. 1. Asymmetric network
Example 1. Consider the network depicted in Figure 1, studied in [2]. There
are two origin/destination pairs, (A,B) and (C,D). fj is the flow on edge j. The
(affine linear) cost functions considered in [2] associated with the links are:
ℓ1(f1) = f1 + 30; ℓ4(f4) = f4 + 60; ℓ7(f7) = f7; ℓ2 = ℓ3 = ℓ5 = ℓ6 = 0.
Each player has a flow volume of 630.
For this network, [2] give the following results (an “atomic” player is a player
with splittable flow that tries to minimise the overall cost of that flow):
1. Socially optimum flow (System Equilibrium(SE)): social cost is 566550.
2. Wardrop equilibrium with infinitely many infinitesimal users (in [2], the “user
equilibrium” (UE)): Social cost is 567000.
3. Nash equilibrium ((A,B)-player is atomic; (C,D)-player is Wardrop): social
cost is 572400.
4. Nash equilibrium (both players are atomic): social cost is 576404.
Observation 2 For this example from [2], the cost of SSL is greater than 1.
If the (A,B)-player is atomic and a selfish Stackelberg leader, the social cost is
580032 if the (C,D)-player is atomic. If the (C,D)-player is a Wardrop flow,
the social cost turns out to be 583538 — the leader is able to force even more of
the remaining flow onto link 7.
Cominetti et al. [4] show that for this network topology there is a price of
anarchy for homogeneous latency functions. They consider an example where
the (A,B) and (C,D) players have flows of 2 and 3 respectively, and edges have
latencies ℓ1(f1) = f1, ℓ4(f4) = f4, ℓ7(f7) = 2f7. The optimal (balanced) flow
has cost 10 and the Nash equilibrium has cost approximately 10.47.
Observation 3 In this example of [4], the price of SSL is 10.52/10.47 ≈ 1.0048.
If the (A,B)-player has Stackelberg leadership then the cost is 10.52 (his flow
on link 1 is 1611 , flow of follower on link 7 is
12
11 ) and if the (C,D)-player has
Stackelberg leadership the cost is 10.50 (flow of (A,B)-player on link 1 is 32 , of
(C,D)-player on link 7 is 1).
It is sometimes better for follower’s flow to be controlled by continuum non-
atomic players rather than an atomic player as we demonstrate in the following
example.
Example 2. Consider a 2-node, 2-parallel-link network, in which the first link
has latency function ℓ1(f1) = f1 and the second link has latency function
ℓ2(f2) = f2 + 1. Let us suppose that the leader has flow f
1 = 12 unit and
the follower has flow f2 = 12 unit to be routed. Then if the follower is splittable
player, the Stackelberg equilibrium is
(
{f11 , f
1
2}, {f
2
1 , f
2
2 }
)
=
(
{ 12 , 0}, {
3
8 ,
1
8}
)
as a
result of that the leader gets the cost of (12 )(
1
2 +
3
8 ) =
7
16 ≈ 0.44; and the follower
gets the cost of (38 )(
1
2 +
3
8 ) + (
1
8 )(
1
8 + 1) =
15
32 ≈ 0.47.
If the follower is a collection of infinitely many players each controlling a
negligible fraction of the flow, the Stackelberg solution is
(
{ 38 ,
1
8}, {
1
2 , 0}
)
which
incurs the leader’s cost of 0.47, and the follower’s cost of 0.44.
4.2 Computing the lower bound for 2 symmetric links
Standard Nash equilibrium. Players 1 and 2 solve the problems minC1 and
minC2 accordingly, where Ci is the cost to player i. In this proof we assume
player 1’s flow is 1 and player 2’s flow is r. Player 1 solves an optimisation
problem minC1.
C1 = (a1(f
1
1 + f
2
1 ) + b1)f
1
1 + (a2(f
1
2 + f
2
2 ) + b2)f
1
2
= (a1(f
1
1 + f
2
1 ) + b1)f
1
1 + (a2(1− f
1
1 + r − f
2
1 ) + b2)(1 − f
1
1 ) (1)
where f12 and f
2
2 are substituted with 1− f
1
1 and r − f
2
1 respectively.
Of course, C2 has a similar expression. By setting the derivatives to zero and
solving algebraically, we get the following expression for the social cost:
C1 + C2 =
9(1 + r)(a2b1 + a1(a2 + b2 + a2r))− 2(b1 − b2)2
9(a1 + a2)
(2)
Cost with Selfish Stackelberg Leadership (SSL). Player 1 selects his action in
the game first. He predicts what player 2 will do by solving minC2 in terms of
his own flows, and chooses his own flows to minimise his own cost under that
assumption. Again, this can be solved algebraically by finding expressions for f21
and f22 in terms of f
1
1 and f
1
2 , plugging these expressions into (1), and minimizing
over f11 and f
1
2 . The social cost with SSL is given by
C1 + C2 =
16(1 + r)(a2b1 + a1(a2 + b2 + a2r)) − 3(b1 − b2)
2
16(a1 + a2)
(3)
The price of SSL: This is the ratio of (3) and (2) which is given by
9(16(1 + r)(a2b1 + a1(a2 + b2 + a2r)) − 3(b1 − b2)2)
16(9(1 + r)(a2b1 + a1(a2 + b2 + a2r)) − 2(b1 − b2)2)
(4)
We have to make sure that all flows are feasible. In other words 0 ≤ f11 ,
f12 ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ f
2
1 ,f
2
2 ≤ r. Therefore we have
2a1 + b1 − b2 ≥ 0
2a2 − b1 + b2 ≥ 0
3a1r + b1 − b2 ≥ 0
3a2r − b1 + b2 ≥ 0
We maximise the Price of SSL in Equation (4) under the above constraints.
The maximum is 93/88 ≈ 1.057, achieved when 2a1 = b2, a2 = b1 = 0 and
r = 2/3.
The solutions: The standard Nash solution has f11 =
2
3 ; f
2
1 =
2
3 . The SSL solution
has f11 = 1; f
2
1 =
1
2 ; player 1 (the leader) has forced player 2 to displace some
of his flow onto link 2. If player 2 is a Wardrop flow, solutions to both versions
have f11 =
2
3 ; f
2
1 =
2
3 (the same as the standard Nash solution) — thus player 2
is better off as a Wardrop flow, than as a “coalition” of the infinitesimal users
that constitute a Wardrop flow.
Observation 4 There is no cost to Stackelberg leadership in the special case of
symmetric access to parallel links having homogeneous linear costs. Furthermore
the Nash equilibrium is the same as in the standard Cournot setting.
4.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n let fj denote the flow in link j. The benefit of transferring
ǫ from j to j′ is the new cost minus the old cost, so it is given by
(fj − ǫ).ℓj(fj − ǫ) + (fj′ + ǫ).ℓj′(fj′ + ǫ)− [fj.ℓj(fj) + fj′ℓj′(fj′)]
= fj .
(
ℓj(fj − ǫ)− ℓj(fj)
)
+ fj′ .
(
ℓj′(fj′ + ǫ)− ℓj′(fj′)
)
− ǫ.ℓj(fj − ǫ) + ǫ.ℓj′(fj′ + ǫ).
In the limit of ǫ −→ 0 this is equal to
−ǫ.fj.
∂(ℓj(fj))
∂fj
+ ǫ.fj′ .
∂(ℓj′(fj′))
∂fj′
− ǫ.ℓj(fj − ǫ) + ǫ.ℓj′(fj′ + ǫ)
Set the above to zero for optimality; divide by ǫ, note that ℓj(fj + ǫ) −→
ℓj(fj), hence
fj
∂(ℓj(fj))
∂fj
+ ℓj(fj) = fj′
∂(ℓj′(fj′))
∂fj′
+ ℓj′(fj′).
In the linear context where ℓj(fj) = ajfj + bj , we are saying that for all j,
fj .aj + ajfj + bj is the same, i.e. the result follows. ⊓⊔
